A decades-old conflict between Israel and Iran that was never quite “cold” is rapidly heating up. In the days since the first Israeli attacks against the Iranian nuclear program and military leadership, more than two hundred people have been killed in Iran and at least two dozen have died in Israel. The escalating war raises all sorts of questions, from military mechanics to humanitarian efforts to Washington diplomacy and the global energy supply. Below, the Atlantic Council’s authorities on the Middle East unpack this increasingly volatile moment for the region. Read on for expert responses to twenty pressing questions on this emerging war.
1. What was the Israeli calculus in launching Friday’s strikes against Iran?
Israel recognized a golden opportunity to seize Iranian weakness,
following the collapse of is proxy “Axis of Resistance” led by Hezbollah
along with Israel’s operational achievements of its October 2024 attack
on Iran, when Israel destroyed Tehran’s strategic air defense
system. The fact that the path to Iran was open to the Israeli Air Force
was a significant factor in the decision to launch the attack,
especially as Iran was advancing dangerously in its enrichment program.
In addition, Israel recently received intelligence that Iran had resumed
its “weapons group” activity in pursuit of a nuclear weapon. The
combination of a country on the verge of military enrichment and an
active weapons group was too dangerous in the eyes of Israel, which
sought to exploit the operational window of opportunity and attack Iran
as soon as it received the green light from US President Donald Trump.
—Danny Citrinowicz is
a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.
He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command
positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence, including as the head of
the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division.
2. How effective has Israel been in dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities?
First, the Israeli operation’s objective was not defined as a
complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear program. Even before its Friday
attack, it was clear that Israel has a relatively limited ability to
destroy nuclear capabilities without active participation from the
United States. Israel can, however, significantly delay Iran’s nuclear
program (by at least a year), mainly by striking facilities—starting
with Natanz—assassinating nuclear scientists who represent a key
bottleneck in the program, and damaging additional sites. Nevertheless,
without striking the enrichment facility at Fordow, which likely would
require US participation, Iran’s nuclear program cannot be destroyed,
only significantly delayed.
As for Iran’s willingness to move
forward with its nuclear program, the attack may, paradoxically,
encourage Iran to break out toward a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless,
making such a decision at this time, especially in view of the intensive
Israeli Air Force activity over Iran and Israel’s deep intelligence
penetration into Iran’s nuclear program, would be extremely dangerous
for Iran and might even motivate Washington to directly join the
campaign. Therefore, Iran may prefer to avoid a nuclear breakout—at
least at this stage—and instead consider this option in the future.
—Raz
Zimmt is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security
Studies and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv
University. He is also a veteran Iran watcher in the Israeli Defense
Forces. Follow him on X: @RZimmt.
3. How forcefully has Tehran responded, and what has the impact been?
I think we are seeing that Iran’s bark is worse than its bite.
Israel’s military and intelligence superiority over the Islamic Republic
has overwhelmed and severely weakened the regime through decapitations,
degradation of its armed forces, and damage to its nuclear program.
Iran cannot compete with the surgical and lethal precision with which
Israel is mounting its campaign. Israel’s leadership likely factored in
the damage to the home front when making the decision to strike Iran so
aggressively, and that speaks to the confidence the Israeli defense
establishment has in its ability to manage and counter Iranian
retaliation.
The one area I am most concerned about is the
prospect of Tehran activating contingency operations targeting Israeli
and Jewish interests abroad via terrorism. Iran may also consider
targeting the energy interests of US partners in the Arab world as a
means of extracting economic pain for these Israeli attacks. Tehran may
likewise turn to cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. But in
the end, Iran will face supply constraints, and we’re already seeing
missiles being lobbed at Israel in more limited quantities, likely to
preserve capacity.
—Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director
of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI). His research specialties include
Iranian leadership dynamics, Iran’s military and security services, and
Iran’s proxy and partner network. He is on X @JasonMBrodsky.
4. What are the the environmental and health concerns from attacks on nuclear facilities?
Attacks on nuclear facilities carry the grave threat of significant
impacts on health and the environment. In its June 13 statement
following Israel’s launch of strikes on Iran, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) noted
that “at present, the competent Iranian authorities have confirmed that
the Natanz enrichment site has been impacted and that there are no
elevated radiation levels.” On June 14, the IAEA said there was also no
change in offsite radiation at the Esfahan site, where four buildings,
including a uranium conversion facility and a fuel plate fabrication
plant, had been hit in the attacks from Israel.
—Jennifer T. Gordon
is the director of the Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative and the Daniel
B. Poneman chair for nuclear energy policy at the Atlantic Council’s
Global Energy Center.
5. How has the IAEA responded, and are there restrictions around striking nuclear facilities under international law?
The IAEA has responded to Israel’s attacks on Iranian nuclear sites
by reiterating its stance that “nuclear facilities must never be
attacked regardless of the context or circumstances.” The IAEA’s General
Conference has published resolutions noting that “any armed attack on
and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes
constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter,
international law and the Statute of the Agency.” Whether Iran’s
nuclear facilities were devoted solely to peaceful use is unclear, but
regardless, attacks against any type of nuclear facility set a dangerous
precedent and make it increasingly difficult to pull back from
conflict.
—Jennifer T. Gordon
6. How aligned, or not, are Washington and Jerusalem?
Trump’s administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s government are closely aligned on goals, but less aligned on
means. They both share the goals of wanting to prevent the Islamic
Republic from ever having a nuclear weapon. They share the goal of Hamas
being permanently removed from power in Gaza, and for Hezbollah to have
far less power in Lebanon than it does now.
On means, Trump wanted to avoid war—he wants to be a
peace-through-strength president, and he has people talking in one ear
about supporting Israel and the other about staying clear of Middle East
wars. Netanyahu sees a narrow window to eliminate the Iranian nuclear
threat and does not believe that the Iranian regime will ever agree to
the kind of deal Trump wants. For Netanyahu, war now was the only
option.
The other important dynamic is that both Trump and
Netanyahu believe they have a unique destiny to lead their nations at
this hour—but both leaders face a public that is deeply divided about
the wisdom of their policy choices. Both are gamblers and will double
down when they are convinced they are right. It is inconceivable,
therefore, that Trump would ever pressure Netanyahu to end the war short
of what it will take to assure Israel’s security.
—Thomas S. Warrick
is a nonresident senior fellow with the Adrienne Arsht National
Security Resilience Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and
Security and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle
East Programs at the Atlantic Council.
7. Has the conflict tanked the likelihood of achieving a US nuclear deal with Iran?
The nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran seemed to
have reached an impasse prior to the launch of Israeli strikes, with
Washington insisting that Iran must give up enrichment and Tehran,
including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, insisting that Iran would never
give this up. The breadth of Israeli military strikes against Iran,
spanning key parts of its nuclear infrastructure, senior military
officials and nuclear scientists, ballistic missile stockpiles, and more
recently energy infrastructure, probably are read in Iran as aimed at
regime change, and make it more likely that Tehran will consider a
nuclear breakout rather than a compromise in negotiations. That said,
Iran may believe it can exploit Trump’s public calls for an end to the
fighting and a return to the negotiating table by hinting at concessions
that would get the United States to press Israel to stand down, at
least temporarily. So a nuclear deal seems remote—but an Iranian
negotiating ploy to try to ensure regime survival could be in the cards.
—Alan Pino
is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security
Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and a former
US national intelligence officer for the Near East.
8. Has Washington’s force posture in the Middle East shifted since Friday, and what does this tell us about potential US involvement?
Since Thursday, the Pentagon has approved significant force posture changes for US Central Command (CENTCOM). These changes include a large deployment of KC-135/KC-46 aerial refueling tankers. Depending on the numbers of tankers involved, this could be one of the largest peacetime tanker movements in history. The USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group’s deployment was extended in the Middle East. Also, the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group is moving to the CENTCOM region for overlapping carrier presence. European Command has the USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116) now repositioned in the Eastern Mediterranean to contribute air defense support to Israel.
These publicly observable movements may not be the only force posture additions in the Middle East. What these changes portend is that the United States is giving itself flexible military options. This means that Washington can contribute to Israel’s operational tempo of attacks through air-to-air refueling. The United States can also increase its ability to respond through any ground-based US Air Force fighters as well as the aircraft from two carrier strike groups. Finally, this means the United States is increasing its defensive presence to contribute to the air defense of Israel.
—Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He
served on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023 as the
director for defense and political-military policy for the Middle East
and North Africa.
9. What does the response of Iran’s regional proxies tell us?
Iran’s regional proxies have been significantly weakened. Hamas has
been decimated. Hezbollah has been badly degraded to the point where
there have been public reports about its wariness of getting drawn into
this conflict between Israel and Iran. Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria
is gone. The Houthis retain a capability to strike Israel, but are not a
strategic threat. The Iraqi Shiite militias also have resources. But
the Islamic Republic’s proxy and partner network is a shell of its
former self.
—Jason M. Brodsky
10. How could this impact Palestinians in Gaza?
The prevalent fear in Gaza is that an Israel-Iran war will distract
from the already significantly dimmed light on the ongoing starvation
and slaughter of civilians in the Palestinian enclave. There is also
concern that war may lead to even more impunity and an escalation of
Israeli bombardment in Gaza. Some people in Gaza that I’ve spoken with
are terrified at the level of chaos the Iran strikes could bring—namely,
the potential of this conflict spreading further across the region such
that it will result in an even more prolonged war inside Gaza. However,
some believe, or maybe hope, that this will help at least end this
phase of the nightmare, although they don’t really know exactly what an
“end” looks like.
—Arwa Damon
is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri
Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the
International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA).
Hamas
undoubtedly imagines that an Israeli-Iranian war may strategically
relieve some of the pressure on the Islamist group in the Gaza Strip, as
the Israeli military reallocates intelligence and kinetic strike
capabilities to the new theater.
Still, Israel will likely maintain a steady tempo of bombardment and ground operations against suspected Hamas targets in Gaza, as it has since the initiation of hostilities with Tehran. The new war is unlikely to prove beneficial to Hamas in any tactical or geostrategic way. In fact, in the medium term, Hamas’s regional posture will be further degraded by the weakening of its chief backer and supporter in Tehran.
Many Palestinians in Gaza have been subtly or even openly gloating
about Iran’s woes, holding Tehran directly responsible for the
destruction of their lives through Hamas and the network of anti-Israel
terror organizations that served it. Though it may have limited tactical
impact in the near term, the weakening or possible collapse of the
Iranian regime will be a positive development for the prospects of
Gaza’s rejuvenation and regeneration after the war, as well as peace
between Palestinians and Israelis.
—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib
leads Realign For Palestine, an Atlantic Council project that
challenges entrenched narratives in the Israel and Palestine discourse.
11. Could this war benefit or harm Russia, and how is Moscow navigating both sides?
Russia could potentially benefit from the Israel-Iran conflict, by US attention and support being redirected from Ukraine to Israel, and by the rise in oil prices which provide Moscow with greater resources to fund its war against Ukraine. If the Israel-Iran conflict ends quickly, though, these benefits may not last long. The recent phone call between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which both called for an end to the Israel-Iran conflict, also furthers Putin’s aim of increasing Russian cooperation with Washington despite the war in Ukraine continuing.
But, as some Russian commentators have noted, the Israel-Iran conflict also involves the risk of regime collapse in Iran. Like in Syria, this would mean the downfall of a longstanding government that had cooperated closely with Moscow, and Russia having to compete with others for influence with the new authorities emerging in Iran afterward, whatever they might be. With Russia preoccupied by its war against Ukraine, however, Putin would not be in a strong position to do this.
Thus, while the Israel-Iran conflict provides some benefits to Russia, it also poses serious risks for it as well. Putin’s calls to end the Israel-Iran conflict through diplomatic means, then, undoubtedly reflect what he really wants to see happen. Yet even if the conflict does end through (as Putin wants) joint Russian-American mediation efforts, it could result in Iran being more cooperative with the United States than it has been in the past.
—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.
12. Could this war benefit or harm China, and how is Beijing navigating both sides?
China condemned Israel’s
attack and has called on both sides to de-escalate. Nevertheless,
Beijing almost certainly sees an opportunity to promote itself as a
responsible actor, and even a potential mediator, in the crisis. A
wider, regional conflict would raise China’s risk-to-benefit calculus as
it would threaten its regional economic, namely energy, interests. As such, China would welcome Washington
reining in Israel and resuming talks with Iran. China will also be
quick to amplify US failings, real or not, if the situation deteriorates
as part of its broader campaign to undermine the United States’
global position and influence.
—Gabriel “Gabo” Alvarado is a former nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. He currently works at Nisos.
13. What weapons have Israel and Iran deployed so far?
From June 13-16, Israel flew F-35I, F-15I, and F-16 aircraft to conduct hundreds of airstrikes using GBU-28 bunker busters, Rampage missiles, and precision munitions against Iranian nuclear facilities, military leadership, and critical infrastructure. Iran retaliated with hundreds of ballistic missiles from its arsenal. Iran‘s attacks include Fattah hypersonic missiles, Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, and other missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to target Israel in “Operation Severe Punishment.”
—Daniel E. Mouton
14. What are the nuclear counter-proliferation implications of the conflict?
The counter-proliferation implications of this conflict are noteworthy. The IAEA on June 12 declared Iran non-compliant with
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations for the first time in
twenty years. Iran responded by announcing a third uranium enrichment
site and threatening NPT withdrawal. While Israel may have destroyed
Natanz’s above-ground enrichment plant, the crisis runs the risk of
paradoxically accelerating proliferation risks. If this conflict does
not fully eliminate the current and future threat of Iranian
proliferation, Iran’s irreversible knowledge of the enrichment cycle
means that it can simply rebuild and do so with a greater desire to
succeed next time.
—Daniel E. Mouton
15. What Iranian oil and gas facilities has Israel targeted, and does this have an impact on the wider fallout?
Israel appears to have successfully hit two natural gas processing facilities in Phase Fourteen of the South Pars gas field, forcing Iran to suspend operations there. Iran’s natural gas production is consumed domestically due to significant sanctions on exporting natural gas. Israeli strikes also hit a major fuel depot and an oil refinery near Tehran. These are significant hits because Iran’s energy situation was already precarious, with parts of the country experiencing planned blackouts due to electricity shortages. Without consistent access to fuel, Iranians living in Tehran cannot evacuate. If Israel takes out additional domestic energy sites around Iran, the potential for the country to simply fall apart is very high. Without fuel, food cannot be transported to cities. Without electricity and running water, illness will proliferate and people will die.
At the same time, Israel has not gone after oil production facilities or Kharg Island, where 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports are loaded onto tankers. This leaves Iran’s role in the global oil market relatively unchanged, keeping China satisfied and oil prices under control. If Israel does attack Iran’s oil production or export sites, the entire paradigm will change. As senior official Javad Larijani recently said, if Iran’s oil facilities are severely damaged, Tehran won’t let any country in the region use its own oil.
—Ellen R. Wald is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the president of Transversal Consulting.
16. What is the Strait of Hormuz, and why does it matter if Tehran closes it?
Most oil market watchers think this conflict is a direct threat to the Strait of Hormuz, a very narrow waterway that leads out of the Persian Gulf. Oil tankers loading oil from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, parts of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iran must pass through this chokepoint to exit the Gulf. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s seaborne crude oil exports travel through the Strait of Hormuz. It is very narrow, rocky, and only deep enough for oil tankers to navigate in certain places. The current traffic patterns for the Strait have ships traveling through Iranian waters to enter and exit the Gulf.
Iran may be able to block ships using ships and missiles launched
from the shore, though this would only be temporary as the traffic
pattern can be rerouted around Iranian waters. It would take some time,
and there would be a period of dislocation during which oil prices would
spike, but it could be done. However, Iran will only directly threaten
the security of ships in the Persian Gulf if it has nothing to lose.
Since Iran continues to export oil and condensate, and needs to continue
to do so to fund its operations, it is extremely unlikely that it will
take action to hamper or halt any ship traffic into or out of the
Persian Gulf.
—Ellen R. Wald
17. What dynamics is the Iranian regime grappling with domestically, and how will this impact the conflict?
At this stage, the Iranian regime appears to be maintaining its
unity, resolve, and stability, and is closing ranks in the face of an
external threat. The anger of the Iranian public, whose hostility toward
the regime is well known, has grown due to the authorities’ failure to
provide security and protect their people. Nevertheless, it seems that
at this moment, the public’s attitude is influenced largely by images of
civilians injured and damage to residential neighborhoods in Tehran
from Israeli Air Force attacks. This could contribute (at least for now)
to a strengthening of national solidarity and a rally-around-the-flag
effect. Nevertheless, the continued Israeli military efforts may, over
time, weaken the regime’s security, intelligence, and governmental
structures, as well as its ability to deal with internal challenges,
which could, in the future, pave the way for undermining its stability.
—Raz Zimmt
18. How is the Iranian public responding?
With the caveat that my sources are limited, I’m seeing a range of responses from the Iranian people. Regime supporters, who are now a small minority, are predictably outraged at Israel and support the Islamic Republic’s retaliatory strikes. Most Iranians at this point oppose their regime, and there’s little love lost for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders whom Israel killed. However, many Iranians are expressing sorrow for the innocent civilians killed in the Israeli strikes, particularly those who died when Israel struck residential apartment buildings in Tehran. For Iranians who lived through the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the strikes have also stirred up traumatic memories of bombs raining down on Tehran during that war.
It’s important to note that a lot of Iranians, including those who oppose their government, have complicated feelings about the country’s nuclear program. Many feel that Iran has a right like any other country to have a nuclear program for energy purposes. Yet the idea of developing a nuclear weapon is controversial, with many opposing nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons. The Iranian people also overwhelmingly do not want war. The majority at this point want to see the end of the Islamic Republic and its replacement with a democratic system grounded in human rights and peace.
Mostly, I’ve seen the Iranian people express a lot of anger at their
own government for the current situation. They’ve pointed out how there
was no warning from the government, no air raid sirens or any other
alert, before the Israeli strikes hit. Instead, the strikes hit
residential buildings in the early hours of the morning as the people
inside slept, oblivious to the danger headed toward them. The public is
angry, but not surprised, that the Islamic Republic did not protect its
own people. They’ve suffered a lot already, and they are fearful,
worried, and angry that many more innocent Iranians are likely to suffer
in the conflict to come, especially if things escalate into all-out
war.
—Kelly J. Shannon is a historian and visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project Working Group.
19. How is the Israeli public responding?
Most of the Israeli public supports the government’s action and sees
the launch of strikes as necessary considering the claims that Iran is
dangerously close to a nuclear bomb. Meanwhile the public is giving
credit to the government in the campaign, despite the severe casualties
on the Israeli home front.
—Danny Citrinowicz
20. Where do we go from here?
Israel’s broad-based assault on Iran’s nuclear and governmental
infrastructure and Tehran’s massive missile barrages against Israeli
civilians have raised the stakes sky-high for both countries, making it
hard to engineer a cease-fire. Israeli officials continue to say that
they have many more targets to strike, as they broaden their campaign
beyond nuclear installations, top military officials, ballistic missile
launch pads, and stockpiles to Iran’s energy infrastructure and
government buildings in Tehran.
When asked by an interviewer if Israel is seeking regime change in Iran, Netanyahu said
that regime change could be the result of Israel’s actions because “the
Iran regime is very weak.” Israel, at a minimum, wants to do enough
damage to Iran’s nuclear program that Tehran cannot reconstitute it for
the foreseeable future or race to get a nuclear weapon.
Iranian
leaders seem to calculate they must continue to show they can inflict
punishment on Israel or risk further losing credibility in the eyes of
Iranians and perhaps face significant unrest from their population, many
of whom have turned against the ruling clerics.
Trump may be the wild card here depending on whether he wants to let the two sides “fight it out,”
or if he decides to press Israel to wind down its attacks and Iran to
return to nuclear negotiations. Given that a nuclear deal in which Iran
gives up enrichment is unlikely, even if a temporary halt to the
fighting is achieved, Israel will keep Iran in its crosshairs and
conflict between the two countries will dominate Trump’s Middle East
agenda for the forseeable future.
—Alan Pino
Source: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/twenty-questions-and-expert-answers-on-the-israel-iran-war/
Comments
Post a Comment